The Seventh Circuit recently addressed an open issue under Wisconsin products liability law—do manufacturers of prescription drugs or medical devices satisfy their duty to warn of product risks by informing prescribing physicians (rather than the patients themselves) of those risks? In In re: Zimmer, NextGen Knee Implant Products Liability Litigation, No. 16-3957 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018), the federal appeals court predicted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court likely would answer “yes” to that question by adopting the “learned intermediary doctrine.”
At issue in this case was a knee implant manufactured by Zimmer NexGen Flex, an entity that has been subject to numerous complaints from patients alleging that their implants are subject to premature loosening. The claimant in this particular case, Theodore Joas, is a patient who had knee-replacement surgery in Eau Claire in 2008 and filed suit against Zimmer after beginning to feel pain in his new knee in 2011.
Due to the number of similar claims against Zimmer, all litigation involving the Zimmer knee implants, including Mr. Joas’ lawsuit, were transferred to a multidistrict proceeding pending in the Northern District of Illinois. The judge in the multidistrict proceeding subsequently selected Mr. Joas’ suit as a bellwether—a test case—and scheduled his claim to move forward.
Prior to trial, Zimmer moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Joas’ claims. Zimmer argued that the testimony of Joas’ only medical expert must be excluded as unreliable. The doctor’s report applied a differential etiology method that identified the most likely cause of Joas’ injury by eliminating other potential causes. But the medical expert could not affirmatively prove a specific cause for the loosening. The judge excluded the doctor’s opinion under the Daubert standard as lacking any discernable basis for concluding which potential causes were reasonable. The judge then granted Zimmer’s summary judgment motion, holding that, absent expert medical testimony, the factual record did not support Joas’ causation theories. Slip. op. at pp. 3-4.
Rather than challenge the Daubert ruling, Joas argued on appeal that, even withouthis ownmedical expert'stestimony, he could win by proving that Zimmer failed to adequately warn both himself and his doctor of the risks associated with the knee implants. Joas supported his positions with testimony from one of Zimmer’s experts, who opined that it would take two bags of cement to properly bond the knee implant to a patient’s shinbone. Because his doctor used only one bag, Joas theorized that Zimmer failed to satisfy its duty to warn that two bags of cement were needed to properly bond the implant. Id. p. 4.
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument on a number of grounds. With respect to Zimmer’s duty to warn Joas directly, the Seventh Circuit noted that this was an issue of first impression under Wisconsin law. The Court noted, however, that the overwhelming majority of courts from other jurisdictions facing this issue have adopted the “learned intermediary doctrine,” which states that medical device manufacturers satisfy their duty to warn of product risks by informing the prescribing physicians of those risks. The Court predicted that Wisconsin would follow suit. It reasoned that the doctrine recognizes the practical reality that patients cannot obtain such devices without physician intervention and that patients reasonably rely on their physicians to warn them of the risks associated with medical procedures. Id. pp. 5-8.
The Court also noted that Joas’ argument suffered from a lack of evidence to establish causation. A warning directly to Joas would not have changed the outcome given that it was his physician (rather than Joas himself) who selected to use the Zimmer brand of knee implant for his procedure. Any warning directed towards Joas’ surgeon similarly would have failed to make a difference, as the surgeon testified that he performed the surgical cementing technique based on his medical fellowship and residency training and that he did not review Zimmer’s device instructions. While Joas argued for a “heeding presumption” that would allow for a factfinder to presume that a proper warning would have been read and followed by a medical professional, he cited no Wisconsin authority in support of this argument. The Court determined that such a presumption likely would not be adopted by Wisconsin courts. Id. pp. 8-13.
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision is not a binding statement of Wisconsin law, Wisconsin courts will likely follow its well-reasoned analysis adopting and applying the “learned intermediary doctrine” to insulate medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers from claims that they have a duty to warn patients directly. Patients should also view In re: Zimmer, NextGen Knee Implant Products Liability Litigation as a warning that direct causal evidence likely will be needed to prevail on any liability claims against manufacturers of medical products